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Abstract
Using a country-industry panel dataset (EUKLEMS) we uncover a robust empirical regularity,
namely that high-risk innovative sectors are relatively smaller in countries with strict employment
protection legislation (EPL). To understand the mechanism, we develop a two-sector matching model
where rms endogenously choose between a safe technology with known productivity and a risky
technology with productivity subject to sizeable shocks. Strict EPL makes the risky technology
relatively less attractive because it is more costly to shed workers upon receiving a low productivity
draw. We calibrate the model using a variety of aggregate, industry and micro-level data sources.
We then simulate the model to reect both the observed di¤erences across countries in EPL and the
observed increase since the mid-1990s in the variance of rm performance associated with the adoption
of information and communication technology. The simulations produce a di¤erential response to the
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arrival of risky technology between low- and high-EPL countries that coincides with the ndings in the
data. The described mechanism can explain a considerable portion of the slowdown in productivity
in the EU relative to the US since 1995.
Keywords: employment protection legislation, exit costs, Information and Commications Technology,
heterogeneous productivity, sectoral allocation.
JEL Codes: J65; O38
1 Introduction
In this paper we argue that a change in the nature of technological opportunities in the mid 1990s inter-
acted with cross region di¤erences in employment protection to become a prominent cause of the observed
divergence in productivity between the US and the EU. The emergence of accelerating improvements in
computing power coupled with steepening adoption rates of communication technology resulted in a large
variance in realized productivity and prots for rms choosing to use these technologies. The increase
in variance is good for aggregate productivity and appealing to individual rms because good news is
unbounded while bad news is bounded by the option to exit or re workers. When in the mid-nineties
these technological opportunities arose, the expected net benets of exploring this technology were higher
in countries with low EPL because the option to shut down was less costly. We give robust evidence that
in countries with high EPL, high-risk innovative sectors (which are associated with intensive ICT use) are
relatively small. The negative relationship also holds between other exit frictions (i.e. low cost recovery
of capital for exiting rms) and the relative size of risky sectors. We explain the empirical ndings using
a matching model with endogenous technology choice, i.e. rms can choose between a risky and a safe
technology. In a calibrated version of the model, high ring or exit costs reduce the number of jobs in
the risky sector, lower productivity in the risky sector, and lower aggregate productivity.
Our paper draws from and combines results from a variety of di¤erent literatures. The main question
we look at is prominent in the literature on innovation, IT and productivity growth. The model we
use is derived from models in the search literature that mostly have been used to study the e¤ects of
frictions (including EPL) in labor markets, but recently these models are used for studying allocation
and productivity as well. Further, our use of model calibration, and comparison of model simulations
with moments and parameter estimates from data draw on a rich macro literature. Finally, we follow a
lengthy sequence of papers studying the e¤ect of EPL on labor markets and macro outcomes. We discuss
these points in turn.
Growth accounting exercises in the US have shown most of the acceleration of output growth to
be due to ICT capital deepening and to increases in TFP associated with ICT use (for an overview of
the ndings, see Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh 2008). Cross-region comparisons (van Ark, OMahony and
1
Timmer, 2008) show that ICT production and use has been much lower in the EU than in the US and
that this may explain much of the relative slowdown. The growth accounting literature is not, however,
capable of explaining why the ICT producing sector in the EU is smaller, why ICT investment and thus
ICT-capital deepening is lower, why the contribution from ICT-using industries is smaller, and thus why
aggregate productivity diverges. The link we make between technology choice and employment protection
and exit costs in general depends on the special nature of information and communication technology.
A nice case study of such risky innovation is given by Brynjolfsson McAfee, Sorell, and Zhu (2008),
where the benets of adopting an innovative IT system arise in conjunction with a reorganization of the
production process. The success of the innovation can only be determined by experimenting with the
new organization in the market. In case of failure, the conguration of the hardware, software, process,
and organization structure needs to be changed again, while in case of success, the system is scaled up,
for example by replicating it in other locations. This ts nicely with the ndings of Bloom, Sadun, and
Van Reenen (2007) that U.S. multinational rms have high returns to investment in IT in their UK
subsidiaries because they only transplant the IT implementations that were adopted successfully in the
US.
Consistent with this innovation strategy, Brynjolfsson, McAfee and Zhu (2009), nd that the cross-
sectional variance of prots in IT using rms is higher, and has been increasing steadily since 1995,
relative to the cross-sectional variance of prots in rms with low IT uptake. In many cases, the IT and
organizational investments do not lead to success and require either another round of attempts at getting
the implementation right, or exit. Similarly, Bartelsman (2008) nds that the variance of market share
changes among rms in an industry is higher in those countries and industries where rms have higher
adoption rates of broadband internet. In this paper, we nd that the variance of productivity across
rms and the churn of jobs has become higher since 1995 in ICT intensive industries. While the direction
of causality is di¢ cult to ascertain, this evidence shows that higher rates of adoption of new technology
coincide with increased cross-sectional variation in prots, productivity, market share, and employment.
Although we do not explicitly model the process of experimental innovation in detail, our model is
consistent with it. To model this process, the decision to innovate not only requires a xed entry fee but
also requires some complementary factor input, say labor, with an associated ow of factor payments.
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Specically, the risky sector rms are modelled as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and the safe
sector rms are as in Pissarides (2000). Both sectors are connected with each other through the pool of
unemployed workers from which both sectors hire and EPL reduces the risky and increases the safe sector.
The Mortensen-Pissarides search model is particularly useful to study labor market policies because it is
simple and simultaneously solves for the labor market stocks and ows.1 Frictions are essential in our
model to explain the coexistence of vacancies and unemployed workers, but they also are needed to allow
for an equilibrium where both high and low productivity rms can simultaneously exist. As in Mortensen
and Lentz (2008), a key factor for aggregate productivity is the allocation of workers to di¤erent rms.
We calibrate our model for the US using a variety of sources including the EUKLEMS dataset
(OMahony, and Timmer 2009) and a novel dataset built up from rm-level sources (Bartelsman, Halti-
wanger, and Scarpetta 2009, from now on called BHS). By exploring new data sources we are able to
get more information on primitives that previously had to be xed at arbitrary values. For example, we
use our model to derive a relation between the underlying ex ante mean and variance of the productivity
distribution in the risky sectors and the observed (truncated) mean and variances.2 Further we can gen-
erate experiments such as considering the e¤ect of changing the estimated US level of EPL (one month
of production) to European levels (7 months of production).3 Simulated data generated from the model
in this manner shows the same relationship between sector size and EPL interacted with riskiness that
we nd in the actual data.
By now there exists a huge literature on the e¤ects of EPL on labor market performance based
on cross country evidence.4 The main conclusions are that the e¤ects on employment are negative but
small. Participation is typically smaller in countries with strong EPL and the e¤ects on unemployment are
essentially zero. EPL reduces the ows in and out of employment and increases unemployment duration.
1The e¤ects of EPL have been studied extensively in the search matching literature using a single sector model. See e.g.
Brügeman (2006), Burda (1992), Garibaldi (1998), Ljungqvist (2002) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). Alvarez and
Veracierto (2001) study EPL in a Lucas-Prescott search model. Those papers do not consider the allocation of workers over
risky and safe sectors.
2Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) show that under search frictions, technology dispersion can be an equilibrium response of
rms with the same potential outcomes.
3There is a lot of variation in severance payments and procedural cost within Europe. Severance payments range from
from 0 in e.g. the UK and Belgium to 18 months in Italy and 20 months in Portugal for a worker who has been employed
for 20 years. In many European countries, severance payments are equal to one month salary for each year worked.
4This literature includes Addison and Teixeira (2003), Bertola (1990), Blanchard (1998), Lazear (1990), Nickell and
Layard (1998), Blanchard and Portugal (1998), OECD (2004).
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Autor, Kerr, and Kugler (2008) give some evidence that EPL reduces productivity at the plant level
but they cannot rule out that their results are (partly) due to confounding economic shocks. Samaniego
(2006) gives evidence that EPL is negatively correlated with ICT di¤usion. In a related empirical exercise,
Bartelsman, Perotti, and Scarpetta (2008) show that the productivity of broadband intensive industries
relative to other industries is lower in countries with high EPL. Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2009)
give evidence that productivity in high turnover industries is relatively low if EPL is strong which is
consistent with our ndings. However, in our model, turnover is endogenous and depends on the choice
of technology. Our paper is to our knowledge the rst one that gives evidence that ring costs may harm
productivity and innovation by decreasing the size of innovative sectors. We also conrm Samaniegos
nding of a negative correlation between broadband use and EPL across countries. The advantage of cross
country industry panel data is that an attempt can be made to identify the causal e¤ect by controlling
for the possible correlation between strong EPL and other active labor market policies. The sectoral
variation can be used for identication because we can see how relative sector size within a country
varies across countries. Our equilibrium search model explicitly allows for competition between rms in
the innovative and rms in the safe sector and we can jointly derive relative sector sizes, equilibrium
participation, unemployment and employment rates in both sectors. The mechanism that we propose is
related to Saint-Paul (2002) where countries with high EPL specialize in secure goods at the end of their
product cycle while countries with low EPL specialize in more innovative goods.
Finally, there exists a large literature on optimal layo¤ taxes, i.e. Bentolila and Bertola (1990),
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Ljungqvist. Blanchard and Tirole (2008) and Michau (2009) show
that optimal layo¤ taxes are positive if workers are risk averse and cannot borrow against future income.
The motivation for this is Pigouvian; rms do not internalize the increase in UI expenditures when
they re a worker. Since we assume risk neutral workers (or alternatively complete capital markets),
those e¤ects are absent in our model. Finally, Acemoglu and Shimer show that UI benets can have a
positive e¤ect on rm productivity because it stimulates workers to search for high productivity jobs and
stimulates rms to create those jobs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the stylized facts on the productivity diver-
gence. Section 3 discusses our theoretical model which is calibrated in section 4. Section 5 shows our
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main empirical nding that risky sectors are relatively smaller in high-EPL-countries. We conclude with
some reections on the importance of this link between EPL and productivity and with ideas for future
research.
2 Stylized Facts
This section presents some stylized facts on productivity, risky innovation, and sectoral allocation of
labor. We start with a picture that begs the important question: Why has productivity in the EU
stopped converging to the US level, and has it actually been diverging since the mid-nineties? Using data
from the EUKLEMS database, Figure 1 shows real value added per hour worked in the market sector in
the EU-15 versus the United States.5 The nding has spawned an exploration into the details, breaking
the pattern down into contributions of countries and industries, and further into the contributions for
each factor of production. Overall, van Ark, OMahony and Timmer (2008) argue that the European
productivity slowdown is attributable to the slower emergence of the knowledge economy in Europe
compared to the United States. The ndings are that the EU enjoys lower growth contributions from
investment in information and communication technology and has a relatively small share of technology
producing industries. The EU also has slower multifactor productivity growth than in the U.S. where
the acceleration in productivity likely is associated with advances in the innovative uses of information
technology.
The explanation of the why for these ndings that we put forward in this paper has to do with the
nature of innovation in both the production and use of information and communication technologies. In
our model, we assume that the innovative sector also is high risk. That is, a rm that invests in these
technologies or sectors has a higher variance of payo¤s than a rm that invests in more traditional sectors
or in more traditional types of capital equipment. In a recent paper, Brynjolfsson, McAfee, Sorell, and
Zhu (2008) argue that the payo¤ associated with ICT-related business investments comes from scaling
5Output of the fteen EU countries are converted to dollars using industry-of-origin purchasing power parity data from
the EUKLEMS database. The same pattern emerges if one displays relative total factor productivity (TFP) which takes
into account changes in both capital and labor quality. However, for consistency with measures used in our model and
because these data are more consistent across source, we will stick to indicators of ppp-adjusted real value added and hours
worked.
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Figure 1: Labor Productivity EU15 relative to US; source: EUKLEMS
up a successful venture after it has shown its success in smaller-scale experiments. The upshot is that
investing in such experiments has a high chance of failure and a very small chance of a very high payo¤.
Data from Compustat, linked to the Harte-Hank indicators on rm-level ICT investments, show that the
cross-sectional variance of prots of ICT-intensive rms versus non-ICT intensive rms starts diverging
in the mid-nineties (Brynjolfsson, McAfee, and Zhu (2009)), see Figure 2.
Similar evidence is found by analyzing a country/industry panel dataset of indicators built up from
rm-level data. Using linked longitudinal data on sales and broadband use at the rm-level for 13 EU
countries, Bartelsman (2008) nds that industries that have a higher percentage of workers with access
to broadband internet exhibit higher variance of the distribution of rm-level sales growth.
Using the same datasource, the table below shows results for the regression of the coe¢ cient of
variation of labor productivity productivity across rms in an industry on the percentage of workers
with broadband access within the industry. The data (labelled ONS, and described in the section on
empricial evidence) cover the years 2001 through 2005, during which time the penetration of broadband
6
Figure 2: Variance of Gross Prot Margin, source: Brynjolfsson et al. (2009)
was growing rapidly.
Cc;i;t = + Bc;i;t +
X
j
jDj + "c;i;t (1)
Where C is the coe¢ cient of variation of industry productivity in country c, industry i, and year t, B
is the percentage of workers in the industry with access to broadband internet, and D are dummy variable
for each country, industry, and time periods. The regression is run both in levels and rst di¤erences. In
both cases, the correlation is signicantly positive, as shown in table 1. 6 This correlation does not imply
causality, and needs to be interpreted with care because the ex-post observed variance in an industry
may already reect the endogenous rm-level choice of whether to invest in safe or risky innovation.
The data on ICT use at the rm level, linkable to other longitudinal rm-level data is not available
in the U.S. However, the BHS dataset includes time series information on rm entry and exit and on job
6We ran the regression without xed e¤ects and all combinations of country, industry, and or time dimmies. In rst
di¤erences, all coe¢ cients are signicant and roughly equal in size. In levels, regressions with industry but no country
dummies gave an insignicant (negative) correlation. This points to the possibility of an ommitted variable that boosts
both the variance of productivity and the use of broadband, for example decling prices of ICT goods and services.
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Levels First-di¤erences
 0:97
(2:47)
2:03
(3:72)
R2 0:40 0:07
D.F. 650 461
Fixed e¤ects ctry, ind, time ctry, ind, time
Table 1: Productivity variance and broadband use
creation and destruction for detailed industries in the U.S. We use the broadband intensity of industries
in Europe from the ONS dataset to rank industries by ICT intensity. We use this industry ranking
from Europe to split the U.S. industries into high-ICT and low-ICT groups and create indicators of
employment-weighted gross rm turnover and gross job ows for the two aggregates.7 Next, we average
the gross job turnover (job creation plus job destruction divided by employment) and employment-
weighted gross rm turnover (jobs ows of employees shed at rm exit plus hires at entering rms
divided by employment) for the periods 1986-1994 and 1995-2004. The results are shown in table 2. The
patterns are roughly the same as shown for the variance of protability of rms by Brynjolfsson et al.
(2009)
Gross Job Flows Entry-Exit Job Flows
19861994 19952004 19861994 19952004
High ICT Industries 17.5 23.1 6.8 10.4
Low ICT Industries 17.5 18.6 8.1 8.1
Table 2: Gross Job Flows
The next stylized facts portray the productivity and employment evolution of the EU and the US,
split between high-risk industries and low-risk industries. First, we must make a ranking of riskiness.
Based on the above, a good candidate measure of the riskiness of the industry is the fraction of workers
with access to broadband. We calculate this ranking for the EU15 country with the lowest OECD-EPL
indicator, namely the United Kingdom. Other indicators of riskiness related to the observed distribution
of rm-level productivity, such as the variance of the productivity distribution across rms, generate the
7The cut-o¤ industry for high-versus low-ICT using sectors is chosen to split employment in Europe evenly.
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same stylized results. In section 5 we discuss this in greater detail. First, the productivity levels (ppp-
adjusted real value added per hour) of the risky industries within the broad market sector are higher
than the safe sector, both in the EU15 and in the U.S, see Figure 3. However, in the EU the risky sector
productivity is forty percent higher than the safe sector, with a slight increase over time, while in the
US, the risky sector starts sixty percent more productive, but rises rapidly over time and ends up twice
as productive as the safe sector. Next, the share of employment going to the risky sector in the EU stays
near fty percent, while it is nearly at sixty percent in the U.S.8
1990 1995 2000 2005
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
year
Employment share risky sector
US
EU
1990 1995 2000 2005
1.2
1.5
1.8
2.1
year
Relative productivity risky sector
US
EU
Figure 3: Risky Sector vs Safe Sector: US and EU
A nearly identical picture emerges when we split the EU15 into countries with high EPL and low
EPL (see gure 4). During the late 1990s high-EPL countries in the EU did not see an accerleration in
productivity or employment share in the risky sector. These are the main stylized facts to be explained by
our model and explored further in detail in section 6. The distribution of EPL across countries does not
change appreciably over time (see Nicoletti,Scarpetta, and Boylaud, 2000), thus changes in EPL alone
cannot explain the productivity divergence. The core of our explanation is that employment protection
makes ring more costly and makes the risky sector less attractive to open jobs. Moreover it shifts the
ring threshold productivity level (below which a worker is red) to the left and reduces the average
8 In our model, risky sector productivity is lower in high-EPL countries because low-productive jobs do not shut down.
In the actual industry data, it is likely that rms choose between riskier and safer activities within each industry and that
more safe activities lower average industry productivity in risky sectorsin high EPL countries.
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productivity in the risky sector. The EPL distribution has not changed much in the nineties so this by
itself cannot explain the US-Europe divergence but our story is that the US was able to better explore
the benets from the new risky ICT technologies that became available during the nineties.
1990 1995 2000 2005
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
year
Employment share risky sector
EU low EPL
EU high EPL
1990 1995 2000 2005
1.2
1.5
1.8
2.1
year
Relative productivity risky sector
EU low EPL
EU high EPL
Figure 4: Risky Sector vs Safe Sector: High and Low EPL EU Countries
3 The model
Consider a labor market of size l 2 [0:1] with search frictions and free entry of vacancies where risk
neutral rms can invest in one of two technologies; a risky one or a safe one. In the safe technology sector
(0), all matches are equally productive as in Pissarides (2000) while in the risky technology sector (1),
rms are hit by shocks that can increase or decrease productivity as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
Those shocks can be interpreted as demand and or supply shocks. All risk neutral workers are identical.
A matched worker-rm pair in sector 1 produces y + x where x is a draw from F (x) with mean  and a
variance of 2: F (x) has no mass points and at this stage we do not have to make assumptions on the
support of F (x). The shocks in the risky sector arrive at a (Poisson) rate : When such a shock occurs,
rms must draw a new value of x from F (x). In sector 0,  = 0 and consequently all rms produce y. We
assume that new rms start at y +  rather than at a nite upper support as Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) assume. So in the absence of shocks ( = 0) and for  = 0, sector 0 and 1 would be identical and
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the model reduces to the Pissarides (2000) model.
Wages in sector i, wi are determined from the generalized Nash bargaining solution with continuous
renegotiation (so the wage changes after a shock occurs) and workers cannot search on the job. When
opening a vacancy, the rm can choose which sector to enter. Vacancy creation cost for sector 0 and 1
are respectively given by c0 and c1. Both sectors are hit by exogenous job destruction shocks, . After
such a shock, the match ends and no exit cost has to be paid (as in Brügemann (2007)). This is without
loss of generality; we could alternatively assume that when exogenous job destruction occurs that rms
also have to pay an exit cost but this is equivalent to a decrease in y. Besides exogenous job destruction
the rms in sector 1 choose a unique productivity threshold, xd, below which a job is destroyed. So, in
sector 1, both exogenous and endogenous (at rate F (xd)) job destruction occurs. When a rm decides
to re a worker it must pay an exit cost k. We are interested in how this ring tax distorts the sorting
of rms into safe and risky sectors and the participation decision of workers.9 In the absence of frictions,
rms prefer the risky technology because there is no bound on positive shocks while rms have the option
to close the job if a su¢ ciently large negative shock arrives.
Denote the total stock of vacancies by v and the stock of unemployment by u and dene labor market
tightness  = v=u. We can also dene labor market tightness in each of the sectors as: 0 = v0=u;1 =
v1=u: The total number of matches in each sector is determined by a constant returns to scale matching
function; M0(u; v0) and M1(u; v1) for respectively the safe and the risky sector. The matching functions
are di¤erentiable and strictly concave in each of their arguments. Dene the total matching rate for
workers in sector i as mi = Mi=u. The rate at which vacancies are lled in each sector is then: mi=i.
In this set up, workers always impose negative congestion externalities on each other and positive ones
on vacancies while vacancies only cause negative congestion externalities on other vacancies in the same
sector. We can think of this matching process as one where vacancies for sector 0 are posted on one page
of the newspaper and vacancies for sector 1 on another page and workers pick a page at random and then
a job at random from that page. Alternatively, we can think of sector 0 being located in one area and
sector 1 in another area. We believe this is a reasonable assumption, i.e. posting an ICT vacancy will
9 In our model, the only productive input is labor, and ring costs thus coincide with the more generic concept of exit
costs. We will use the terms interchangeably. In the empirical section we use di¤erent indicators relating to employment
protection, ring costs, and capital losses at exit.
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typically not decrease the rate at which workers meet vacancies in the nancial sector. If unemployment
increases, the matching rate for all workers goes down and for vacancies it goes up while if the number of
vacancies in sector 1 increases, the matching rate for workers goes up and the matching rate for vacancies
in sector 1 goes down. The matching rates in sector 0 are only indirectly a¤ected. Since unemployment
goes down, the matching rate for rms in sector 0 goes down but less so than in sector 1 because the
congestion externality of type 0 vacancies on type 1 vacancies is absent.
Let Vi;be the asset value of a vacancy and let Ji(x)be the asset value of a lled job in sector i. Free
entry of vacancies implies:
rV0 =  c0 + m0
0
[J0   V0] = 0 (2)
rV1 =  c1 + m1
1
[J1(0)  V1] = 0 (3)
Firms pay creation cost, c0 or c1 and at rate mii their vacancies switch to lled jobs. Under free entry,
all prot opportunities are explored in equilibrium so the value of opening a vacancy must be equal to
zero in expectation. Let U be the asset value of an unemployed worker and let Ei(x) be the asset value
for workers employed in sector i: Let S0 be the value of the surplus of a match in sector 0 and S1(x) be
the value of the surplus of a type x match in sector 1.
S0 = J0 + E0   U (4)
S1(x) = J1(x) + E1(x)  U (5)
By our assumption that wages are determined by a generalized Nash bargaining solution with bargaining
power , wages in sectors 0 and 1 are implicitly determined by respectively:
E0   U = S0 (6)
E1(x)  U = max [0; S1(x)] (7)
J1(x) = min[(1  )S1(x); S1(x)]
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Note that S1(x) can be negative for certain realizations of x. The asset value for a lled vacancy in sector
0 is given by :
rJ0 = y   w0   J0: (8)
In the safe sector matches only end if they are hit by a job destruction shock which occurs at rate : In
sector 1 endogenous job destruction is also possible but then rms must pay an exit cost k. As mentioned
before, if the job is hit by an exogenous shock  those cost do not have to be paid. For any realization x,
J1(x) solves:
rJ1(x) = y + x  w1(x)  J1(x) + 
Z xu
xd
[J1(z)  J1(x)] dF (z)  F (xd) (J1(x) + k)

: (9)
A rm with realization, x; receives during the match: y + x  w1(x): If the job is destroyed exogenously
this value becomes zero, if a technology shock arrives (at rate ), the rm can close the job and re the
worker if the shock is below an endogenous threshold xd which occurs with probability F (xd) and this
results in a loss of k. The rm can also decide to continue producing at the new technology if (x > xd)
and the wealth gain or loss for a realization z is then equal to [J1(z)  J1(x)] ;the upper support of F (x)
can be arbitrary large. The threshold value for x below which the job is destroyed, xd, follows from the
following reservation value property:
J1(xd) =  k; (10)
As long as the job is more valuable than the exit cost, it is optimal to remain operational. So the higher
k, the lower the exit threshold. Similarly, the participation constraint for employed workers is that they
should be at least as well of as when they are unemployed. This implies,
E1(xd) = U;
and that the match surplus at the least productive job is negative:
S1(xd) =  k; (11)
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The asset value of being unemployed is:
rU = b+m0 [E0   U ] +m1 [E1 (0)  U ] : (12)
Unemployed workers receive unemployed benets b (for positive analysis this can also be interpreted as
home production) and they nd jobs in the safe and risky sector at rates m0 and m1 they respectively.
Non participants enjoy home production and are not available for the labor market. Let the distribution
of home production be given by H, then the labor force consists of those workers who receive a higher
payo¤ from working than from home production:
l = H(rU): (13)
The value of having a job in the safe sector is simply equal to:
rE0 = w0    [E0   U ] (14)
while the asset value of being employed in the risky sector is given by:
rE1(x) = w1(x)  ( + F (xd)) [E1(x)  U ] + 
Z xu
xd
[E1(z)  E1(x)] dF (z) (15)
Workers receive a wage w1(x), at rate ( + F (xd)) their job is destroyed for exogenous reasons or because
the lower bound threshold productivity is crossed. In that case, the worker becomes unemployed. At
rate  (1  F (xd)), a match is hit by a technology shock above the threshold and the wealth change
for realization z is given by: [E1(z)  E1(x)]. From the Bellman equations above we can derive a job
destruction equation for sector 1 and job creation conditions for sector 0 and sector 1. Together they
jointly determine 1; 1 and xd: Unemployment and vacancies follow from two steady state ow equations.
Details are delegated to the appendix.
14
4 Calibration
We calibrate the structural parameters of our model in three steps. In the rst step, we x some exogenous
parameters according to standard values in the literature. In the second step, we set some other exogenous
parameters at values that match the US labor market stocks and ows. In the third step, which is the
key step of our calibration strategy, we set the productivity shock parameters the arrival rate , the
mean , and the standard deviation  together with the ring costs parameter k in order to match
the observed truncated cross-sectional distribution of US productivity. The right shape comes from the
productivity shock parameters and the right truncation comes from the ring costs parameter. This third
step is most important for us because we are mainly interested in long-run productivity e¤ects. Since we
explore several new data sources we are able to identify the productivity shock parameters including the
arrival rate, which is set to an arbitrary value in previous literature.
4.1 Parameters from other studies
In this step, we x several parameters according to what is common in the literature and we also normalize
two parameters. The parameter values set in this step can be found in Table 3.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the productivity of the safe sector to y = 1. Following Pis-
sarides (2009), and similar to Shimer (2005) and Hall and Milgrom (2008), we set the monthly interest
rate to r = 0:004. Following Shimer (2005), we abstain from market ine¢ ciencies due to search external-
ities by assuming that the Hosios condition  = 1    is satised and we set unemployment benets to
b = 0:4. This lies at the upper end of the range, if interpreted entirely as unemployment benets. It is,
however, too low, if interpretation includes leisure. Hall and Milgrom (2008), for example, think of 0:71
as a reasonable estimate for the ow value of unemployment and think of 0:25 as a reasonable estimate
for unemployment benets. In our model, we distinguish between non-participation and unemployment
and think only non-participants can fully enjoy leisure. Note that our calibration is di¤erent from the
calibration of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) high b and low  and hence we will not be able to
explain the cyclical properties of labor market tightness. It is worthwhile noting that our key results
on long-run productivity e¤ects and the sectoral allocation of workers are robust to changes along this
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dimension.
We do not have appropriate industry-level vacancy data. Having such data is not crucial though; we
can calibrate the matching function parameters  and  using aggregate data. We take the matching
elasticity from Pissarides (2009), that is  = 0:5 which is similar to Hall and Milgrom (2008) and consistent
with the evidence provided in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). Without loss of generality, we normalize
the matching e¢ ciency parameter to  = 0:3.10
Parameter Value Description Motivation
y 1 productivity safe sector normalization
r 0:004 monthly interest rate Pissarides (2009)
 1   Nash bargaining share worker Hosios condition
b 0:4 unemployment benets Shimer (2005)
 0:5 matching elasticity Pissarides (2009)
 0:3 matching e¢ ciency normalization
Table 3: Calibration according to the literature
4.2 Matching the US labor market stocks and ows
In this step, we set several parameters in order to match the US labor market stocks and ows. We
combine aggregate data from the OECD LFS (stocks) and the JOLTS (ows) with industry-level data
from the EUKLEMS. The parameter values set in this step can be found in Table 4.
We set labor market participation l to match the labor market stocks data from the OECD LFS. That
is, we set labor market participation to l = 0:77. We do not back out the underlying distribution of home
production, because it is not identied using only US data. We carry out various robustness checks and
nd that endogenizing labor market participation would strengthen our key results, see section 5.3.
Our safe-risky classication is based on the ONS database. We rank industries in the UK having
the lowest OECD-EPL of the EU15 and hence being the closest related to the US by their broadband
intensity. We split the industry ranking according to EU15 employment and call the top half risky and
the bottom half safe. This ranking is consistent with the stylized facts presented in Figure 3. We have
10As is well known from the literature, the matching technology parameter  and the vacancy creation cost c0 and c1 are
not separatetely identied.
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also experimented with ranking by variance in productivity and with calling the top quartile risky and
the bottom quartile safe, with similar calibration results.
We set the exogenous job destruction rate  to match the labor market ows data from the JOLTS.
Distinguishing between the safe and risky sector is not easy. First, the JOLTS data is based on two-
digit industry codes, while our safe-risky classication is based on three-digit industry codes. This
makes it di¢ cult to use industry-level data from the JOLTS. We set the total separation rate of the
safe as well as the risky sector equal to the total separation rate of the manufacturing sector, that is
ssafe = srisky = 0:029. Secondly, the safe and risky sector di¤er in our model only in terms of riskiness,
while in the real world they also di¤er in other dimensions. There is, for example, a big di¤erence in
skill composition. That is, the safe sector consists of 14% high-skilled, 68% medium-skilled and 18%
low-skilled, while the risky sector consists of 37% high-skilled, 57% medium-skilled and 6% low-skilled,
based on the EUKLEMS. It is important to take this into account, because low-skilled workers face a
much higher separation rate than high-skilled workers. This can easily be a factor ve, see for example
Moscarini (2003). Our aim is therefore to match the model for medium-skilled separation rates, which
we construct from the data. For this purpose, we assume that within-sector di¤erences are the same for
the safe and risky sector, that is
ssafehigh
ssafemedium
=
sriskyhigh
sriskymedium
= !sh < 1
ssafelow
ssafemedium
=
sriskylow
sriskymedium
= !sl > 1.
We set !sh = 0:4 and !
s
l = 2, implying a factor ve di¤erence between high-skilled and low-skilled
and medium-skilled a bid closer related to low-skilled than to high-skilled. From the skill decomposed
separation rates
ssafe = psafehighs
safe
high + p
safe
mediums
safe
medium + p
safe
low s
safe
low
srisky = priskyhigh s
risky
high + p
risky
mediums
risky
medium + p
risky
low s
risky
low
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implying that the medium-skilled separation rates are
ssafemedium =
ssafe
psafehigh!
s
h + p
safe
medium + p
safe
low !
s
l
= 0:026
sriskymedium =
srisky
priskyhigh !
s
h + p
risky
medium + p
risky
low !
s
l
= 0:035.
This gives us ssafemedium = 0:026 and s
risky
medium = 0:035. In the safe sector of our model, there is only
exogenous separation and hence we set the exogenous job destruction rate to  = 0:026. Now the
endogenous job destruction rate must be F (xd) = s
risky
medium    = 0:008. This serves as target in the
next step of our calibration strategy.
Finally, we take the labor market stocks from the OECD LFS and the relative sector sizes from the
EUKLEMS. Together with our safe-risky classication, this gives us u = 0:04, e0 = 0:32 and e1 = 0:41.
We combine these stocks with the above ows to solve for the implied labor market tightness via the safe
and risky sector ow equations (26) and (27 ). We set the vacancy costs c0 and c1 in order to match labor
market tightness. Vacancy costs are dened relative to productivity which is with Hall and Milgrom
(2008) and Hagedorn and Monovskii (2008). Since we do not have appropriate industry-level vacancy
data, we could not distinguish between safe and risky sector vacancy costs. It seems reasonable, however,
that risky sector vacancy costs are larger than safe sector vacancy costs, since vacancy costs also include
capital installment costs and the risky sector has for example a much larger broadband penetration. We
assume that c1 = 2c0. Using the job creation condition of the safe sector (19) we nd that c0 = 0:2092.
Parameter Value Description Motivation
l 0:77 size labor force size labor force (OECD LFS)
 0:026 Poisson rate ex. job destr. ex. job destr. (JOLTS, EUKLEMS)
c0 0:2092 vacancy costs safe sector stocks, ows (OECD LFS, JOLTS, EUKLEMS)
Table 4: Calibration in order to match the US labor market stocks and ows
4.3 Matching the cross-sectional distribution of US productivity
In this step, we set the ex ante productivity shock parameters the arrival rate , the mean , and the
standard deviation  together with the ring costs parameter k in order to match the ex post observed
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truncated cross-sectional distribution of US productivity. More specically, we match the cross-sectional
mean and variance of risky sector productivity and we require risky sector in- and outow to be consistent
with the data. The parameter values set in this step can be found in Table 5.
Cross-sectional mean and variance in the model
Let by be the average output per worker in the risky sector. Workers who have not yet received a
shock, a fraction 1  s, produce y. Workers who have already received at least one shock greater than xd,
a fraction s, produce on average y+ 11 F (xd)
R xu
xd
zdF (z). We can solve for the fraction s using the steady
state ow equation  (1  F (xd)) (1  s) e1 = ( + F (xd)) se1 with the ow into s on the left-hand side
and the ow out of s on the right-hand side, giving us s = + (1  F (xd)). The average output per
worker in the risky sector is
by = y + s 1
1  F (xd)
Z xu
xd
zdF (z) = y +

 + 
Z xu
xd
zdF (z) .
The variance of output per worker in the risky sector is
b = s 1
1  F (xd)
Z xu
xd
(y + z   by)2 dF (z) + (1  s) (y   by)2
=

 + 
 Z xu
xd
z2dF (z)  
 + 
Z xu
xd
zdF (z)
2!
.
Productivity shocks are assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean  and standard deviation .
Using the analytic expressions for the truncated normal distribution, we can simplify the expressions for
by and b, giving us
by = y + 
 + 

1  

xd   


+ '

xd   




b = 
 + 

1  

xd   

 
2 + 2

+ '

xd   


(xd + )

  (y   y^)2
where ' () is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution and  () is its cumu-
lative density function.
Cross-sectional mean and variance in the data
Again, it is important to take the di¤erence in skill decomposition into account, because high-skilled
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are much more productive than low-skilled. This can easily be a factor three, based on evidence from the
EUKLEMS. We assume that within-sector di¤erences are the same for the safe and risky sector, that is
safehigh
safemedium
=
riskyhigh
riskymedium
= !h > 1
safelow
safemedium
=
riskylow
riskymedium
= !l < 1.
We set !h = 2:4 and !

l = 0:8, implying a factor three di¤erence between high-skilled and low-skilled,
and medium-skilled much closer related to low-skilled than to high-skilled. From the skill decomposed
productivities
safe = psafehigh
safe
high + p
safe
medium
safe
medium + p
safe
low 
safe
low
risky = priskyhigh 
risky
high + p
risky
medium
risky
medium + p
risky
low 
risky
low
we can now solve for the medium-skilled productivities
safemedium =
safe
psafehigh!

h + p
safe
medium + p
safe
low !

l
riskymedium =
risky
priskyhigh !

h + p
risky
medium + p
risky
low !

l
.
In our model, only the ratio 
risky
medium
safemedium
is identied (because we have normalized safe sector productivity
to y = 1) which is equal to by, that is
by = risky
safe
psafehigh!

h + p
safe
medium + p
safe
low !

l
priskyhigh !

h + p
risky
medium + p
risky
low !

l
.
We take 
risky
safe
= 1:62 from the EUKLEMS. This would imply by = 1:24; however, we do not feel
comfortable in matching such a high number since there may also be other mechanisms that make the
risky sector more productive than the safe sector. Examples are sorting by unobservable characteristics
(see Gautier and Teulings 2006) and risk premia. Therefore, we match a somewhat lower number, namely
by = 1:1 . Next, we set our target for the standard deviation of the productiviy shocks, b = 0:16, while
the BHS dataset would suggest a cross-sectional standard deviation in the range of 0:2 to 0:3. We also
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want to match a somewhat lower variance because we want to capture the di¤erence between risky sector
variance and safe sector variance. In the BHS data the safe sector productivity also varies across rms,
while it is zero in the model.
Combining the cross-sectional mean and variance with risky sector in- and outow
In addition to the targets for the cross-sectional mean and variance, we obtain two additional targets
via the risky sector in- and outow. In the previous step of our calibration strategy we already determined
the implied labor market tightness based on the stocks and ows observed in the data and we also
determined the endogenous separation rate. We combine information from several new data sources on
the cross-sectional distribution distribution of productivity to identify the productivity shocks parameters
including the arrival rate, which had to be set to arbitrary values in previous literature. In addition to the
targets for the cross-sectional mean and variance, we obtain two additional targets via the risky sector
in- and outow. Appending the targets on the cross-sectional mean and variance with the risky sector
in- and outow and with the job destruction margin, gives us ve equations in ve unknowns. We solve
this system of equation and get  = 0:1410,  = 0:0653,  = 0:4989 and k = 1:2227, see the appendix for
the details.
Parameter Value Description
 0:1410 Poisson rate productivity shock
 0:0653 mean productivity shock
 0:4989 std. deviation productivity shock
k 1:2227 ring costs
Motivation endog. job destruction (JOLTS, EUKLEMS), cross-sectional mean (EUK-
LEMS), cross-sectional variance (BHS), stocks and ows (OECD LFS, JOLTS, EUKLEMS)
Table 5: Calibration in order to match the cross-sectional distribution of US productivity
5 Simulations
5.1 The e¤ects of EPL and rising riskiness
The calibrated model allows simulation of steady-state employment shares and relative productivity by
varying any of the model parameters. Of interest for this paper is the e¤ect of di¤erences across economies
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in exit costs, k. Further, our stylized facts point towards an increase over time in the standard deviation
of productivity shocks, , in the risky sector. The simulations thus consist of computing steady state
employment and productivity outcomes for a wide range of k and .
We allow the exit costs to vary from the calibrated value of the US (k = 1:2), comparable to roughly
one month of output. The low EU values (k = 3) through the high EU values (k = 7) are comparable
to 7 months of production or about 1 year of wages.11 The standard deviation of productivity is varied
from 0.4 to 0.8. This range is consistent with the increase in riskiness that has been observed with rising
ICT use.
The results are presented in Table 6 and in gure 5. The table shows steady state outcomes for a
list of variables for (i) the benchmark  = 0:5 and (ii) a higher  = 0:75 to capture the introduction
of the new ICT technology. Across the columns, as ring cost increase, we see that in the risky sector
there will be less ring (more labor hoarding), and because of that risky-sector productivity falls and the
match surplus decreases. Consequently, labor market tightness goes down in the risky sector. Despite the
lower productivity, wages go up in the risky sector because the (employed) workers bargaining position
improves in the risky sector. The match surplus in the safe sector goes up because essentially the other
sector is being taxed. The safe sector becomes larger except when risk is low and ring costs are high.
In this case, employment is fairly at, as increases in the risky sector resulting from the decrease in
outow balances the decrease in inow and unemployment drops. The drop in unemployment causes
the safe sector to shrink despite the fact that 0 increases. Since unemployed workers are less likely to
get hired in the high productivity risky sector their bargaining position with safe-sector employers goes
down. Next, consider what happens if  increases (i.e. after the ICT revolution). A higher level of ring
cost decreases employment in the risky sector, increases employment in the safe sector, increases wages
in the risky sector, decreases wages in the safe sector and the total employment e¤ect is positive. As
ring costs rise, both the allocation shift towards the safe sector and the increase in labor hoarding will
contribute to lower overall productivity,   e0y+e1y^e0+e1 . Finally, total output net of vacancy costs, labelled

 in the table, unambiguously decreases as ring cost increase, irrespective of .
11Examples of European countries with low EPL are Denmark and the UK; examples of European countries with high
EPL are Portugal and Italy. See the appendix table.
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To summarize, productivity drops with increased ring costs, both from a selection e¤ect (less trun-
cation in the risky sector) and from a reduction in the size of the risky sector. The e¤ect of rising ring
costs increases with . The allocation of workers to the risky sector is not very sensitive to ring costs
when  is low and when ring costs are high, because essentially all jobs are hoarded. Once  rises,
the allocation of labor to the risky sector falls with ring costs. Further, the e¤ect of ring cost on risky
sector allocation becomes stronger (more negative) as  increases.
Benchmark  = :50 k = 1:25 k = 3 k = 7
xd -0.7289 -1.0098 -1.6879
F (xd) 0.0079 0.0022 0.0000
y^ 1.0997 1.0709 1.0554
S1 (0) 3.0123 2.9052 2.8705
1 1.1666 1.0851 1.0594
e1 0.4100 0.4127 0.4191
w1 (0) 0.9790 0.9722 0.9701
S0 0.8903 1.0341 1.0760
0 0.4076 0.5500 0.5955
e0 0.3161 0.3190 0.3146
w0 0.9866 0.9845 0.9839
u 0.0429 0.0373 0.0353
e1=(e0 + e1) 0.5657 0.5651 0.5712
 1.0563 1.0400 1.0317

 0.9654 0.9620 0.9582
High  = :75 k = 1:25 k = 3 k = 7
xd -0.7806 -1.0475 -1.6930
F (xd) 0.0183 0.0097 0.0013
y^ 1.1817 1.1353 1.0708
S1 (0) 3.3146 3.1254 2.9002
1 1.4126 1.2559 1.0814
e1 0.5860 0.4455 0.4175
w1 (0) 0.9829 0.9616 0.9447
S0 0.1830 0.7050 1.0403
0 0.0172 0.2556 0.5565
e0 0.1102 0.2761 0.3150
w0 0.9973 0.9894 0.9844
u 0.0728 0.0473 0.0366
e1=(e0 + e1) 0.8417 0.6174 0.5700
 1.1529 1.0836 1.0403

 0.9875 0.9812 0.9638
Table 6: Model Simulation
The left panel of gure 5 illustrates the e¤ects of changing k and  on employment. If the ring costs
are low enough, employment in the risky sector increases with  because more vacancies are opened in
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the risky sector which implies that fewer unemployed workers are available for the safe sector. For higher
ring costs,  needs to be higher before risky sector employment escapesfrom full labor hoarding and
can benet from the increased risk by truncating the bad draws. For a given level of riskiness, employment
in the risky sector decreases with k, although the e¤ect is small with low levels of  or high ring costs.
The reduced e¤ect of ring costs on employment share with low  occurs because the amount of ring
becomes very small as the ring threshold shifts to the left.
The right panel of gure 5 shows that the relative productivity decreases in k and increases in .
The relative productivity of the safe sector decreases with k because high exit costs shift the threshold of
ring to a lower level of productivity. Aggregate productivity decreases rapidly when k increases, both
because the relative productivity declines and because the share of resources allocated to the risky sector
declines. As the variance of the productivity shock increases, the risky sector becomes more attractive
so it grows while the safe sector shrinks. Further, because of the ring threshold, average productivity
of jobs in the risky sector increases in . The model can also explain that in countries with high ring
cost the risky sector does not increase in response to an increase in  and consequently productivity also
remains almost constant. To the contrary in countries with low ring cost, the employment share of the
risky sector and aggregate productivity strongly increases in response to a new technology with a higher
 as occured at the end of the nineties.
5.2 The e¤ect of an increase in the cost of risky investments
What happens if the cost for risky activities increases? This is in particular relevant in the aftermath of
the credit crisis where in the terminology of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), a ight to quality
took place.12 . Although our model has no nancial sector, we can take a shortcut and model this by
an increase in the vacancy creation cost, c1; for the risky sector. This captures the idea that banks
become reluctant to lent to rms with a high probability to go bankrupt. Figure 6 shows that this can
12Lucas (2008) describes this as: "Everyone wants to get into government-issued and government-insured assets, for
reasons of both liquidity and safety". Caballero and Kurlat (2008) point out that while the US as a whole is regarded to be
save (and this still leads to net capital inows), all other forms of funding dried up. Flight to quality is not specic for the
current crisis but has been reported to take place in many cyclical downturns. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008) give evidence
that the current crisis shows a lot of similarities with past crises around the entire world.
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have substantial e¤ects on productivity because the risky sector becomes smaller. This is one potential
mechanism that can generate long term growth e¤ects of the crisis.
5.3 Endogenous participation
So far we have assumed that labor force participation was exogenous. If we endogenize the participation
rate l according to (13), employment protection has more negative wealth e¤ects because it decreases the
asset value of unemployment and consequently labor force participation
6 Data and empirical results
In this section we explore the empirical relationship between EPL and the allocation of resources to risky
sectors. We assess whether risky industries have relatively higher levels of employment in countries with
low ring costs versus countries with high ring costs. Table 7 provides an overview of the data used
for this exercise. The EUKLEMS database (OMahony and Timmer 2009) provides measures of output,
hours worked, other factor inputs, prices, and industry purchasing power parities for EU countries and
for US, for disaggregated industries covering the whole economy from 1970 through 2004. We use the
share of hours worked in an industry relative to total hours worked in all industries in each country and
time period as the variable to be explained.13
The ring cost indicators are available from two sources. First, a country-time panel dataset collected
at the OECD (Nicolleti, et al. 2000), provides indicators of the stringency of employment protection
(EPL).14 The time dimension of this dataset may contain interpolations between actual component level
information collected from OECD member countries in specic years, and thus has less reliability than
the cross-country dimension. A complementary dataset of indicators of Costs of doing business(CDB),
including entry and exit costs has been compiled by the World Bank (see Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de
Silanes, and Schleifer 2002). Current indicators on, for example, hiring and ring costs, or time to start
a business, are available for many countries from 2004 to the present.
13We limit our study to industries in the Market Sector, dened similarly to that in the EUKLEMS dataset. The market
sector includes industries in manufacturing, trade, nance and business services, but excludes agriculture, government and
services. We also exlcude utilities and nuclear fuel production.
14The OECD index is based on 18 factors of employment protection of regular workers against individual dismissal,
specic requirements for collective dismissals and regulation of temporary employment.
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Figure 6: An increase in the cost of creating risky jobs
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Finally, as a source of information on the riskiness of a sector, we make use of two datasets collected
using the method of distributed micro data research(Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2009).
These datasets include moments computed from the underlying distributions in condential rm-level
datasets available at national statistical o¢ ces, aggregated to the country, industry, and year level. First,
for the 1990s data has been collected for a selection of OECD countries, mostly for rms in manufacturing.
Next, a project, coordinated by the UK O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS 2008), and funded by Eurostat,
compiled information from linked longitudinal business registers, production surveys, and e-commerce
surveys for 13 EU countries for rms in all sectors of the economy for the years 2001 to 2005.
Source Periods Countries Industries Variables
E U K L EM S 1 9 7 0 - 2 0 0 5 E U + U S 3 0 , m a rk e t s e c t o r O u tp u t , f a c t o r in p u t s , p r i c e s , P P P s
O E C D -E P L 1 9 8 5 - 2 0 0 5 * O E C D N o in fo E P L in d ic a t o r s
W B -C D B 2 0 0 4 - 2 0 0 7 W o r ld N o in fo E n t r y / r in g c o s t s , r i g id i t i e s
B H S 1 9 9 0 s O E C D , A s ia , L a t A m 1 6 , m a nu fa c t u r in g . M om en t s f r om rm su r v e y s
O N S /E u r o s t a t 2 0 0 1 - 2 0 0 5 1 3 E U c o u n t r i e s 3 0 , m a rk e t M om en t s f r om rm su r v e y s
Table 7: Data sources
In the available data, we have no direct measure of the variance of shocks faced by rms choosing the
riskysector. Instead, we have the variance of the cross sectional distribution of productivity observed
across rms in each industry in the national datasets. As our model shows, for rms choosing risky
strategies the observed variance is truncated with respect to the underlying distribution of shocks, and
the point of truncation depends on ring costs. However, in the model the observed productivity variance
moves monotonically with the variance of the underlying shocks for any level of ring costs. For our
baseline empirical results we therefore use as the sectoral-riskiness indicator the observed variance of
labor productivity within an industry averaged across countries. For robustness, we also use other proxies
for industry riskiness from the ONS and BHS datasets.
To rank industries according to riskiness, the above indicators from the BHS or the ONS dataset are
averaged over time (and across countries where noted) and are turned into an ordinal index of industry-
specic riskiness. This ordinal ranking is then normalized into a uniform index ranging from -0.5 for
the lowest risk to 0.5 for the highest risk sector.
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The rst results are presented for a regression equation of the following general form:
ec;i;t = + Cfc;t + Cfc;tR()i + FE + "c;i;t (16)
where ec;i;t is the ratio of hours worked in industry i, country c and year t relative to total hours in that
country and year. The exogenous variable Cfc;t is the ring cost or exit cost indicator, and R ()i is
the rank of the industry risk, with a higher rank being more risky. The parameter  measures the e¤ect
of the regulatory environment interacted with the indicator of industry risk on the share of employment
in the industry. Depending on specication, industry xed e¤ects FE (mean levels, including the level
e¤ect of Ri or mean levels and trends) are swept out with appropriate dummy variables.15 This type of
specication has become widespread in evaluation of the impact of policy or environment on performance,
e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1998). Essentially, the equation uses di¤erence-in-di¤erences to identify how
changes in the policy, here Cfc;t, di¤erentially impact di¤erent sectors, based on the expected sensitivity
of the sector to the policy change. To our knowledge, we are the rst in this literature to explicitly model
the interaction between the ranking and the policy instead of relying on reasoned assumption about the
sensitivity.16
Table 8 presents the baseline results for the full sample of all countries with available data for the
period 1995-2005. In this and in all other Figures, t statistics are in parenthesis, the risk indicator is
based on the variance of productivity in the entire sample, industry xed e¤ects and a time trend is
included.
The ring cost variable used is the OECD indicator for stringency of employment protection for regular
workers, and the riskiness indicator is based on the observed variance of labor productivity within an
industry in each of the countries in the ONS dataset. Column (1) shows results when xed e¤ects control
for industry means and xed time e¤ects, and column (2) shows the results with industry mean and
an industry specic time trend removed. The dependent variable is the share of hours worked for that
15Country xed e¤ects are insignicant and numerically very close to zero because the dependent variable is a share and
the level e¤ect of Cf is included.
16Because the employment share variable is bounded between zero and one, we have replicated all our results with a logistic
transformation of the dependent variable. The qualitative results, equation t, and p-level of all estimates are roughly
equivalent, but the parameter value is less easily interpreted. In all our specications we correct for heteroskedasticity in
errors that likely occur in each industry cluster.
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industry as a percentage of total hours for that country and year. The interpretation of the coe¢ cient,
, is as follows: A movement of the EPL index by 1 point, (say from the German value of 2.7 to the
Belgium value of 1.7), will increase the share of employment in the riskiest industry (rank=.5) by 0.5
percentage point, while reducing the share of employment in the safest sector by the same amount.17
(1) (2)
  1:01
(12:75)
 1:01
(12:98)
R2 0:84 0:85
D.F. 5508 5494
Fixed e¤ects industry mean industry mean and trend
Table 8: Regression results
t-statistic in parenthesis. Period: 1995-2005; Industry rank: productivity variance; ExitCost: EPLRegular. See
appendix for country and industry listing.
The next three tables provide some robustness checks concerning the country sample used, the time
periods, the indicators for industry riskiness, and the variables related to layo¤ and exit costs.
In Table 9, the time periods are varied, as are the country samples. Appendix Table 1 shows a
list of countries, and the specied sub-samples. Generally, samples vary by including or excluding non-
EU OECD members, or including/excluding transition economies. For ease of comparison, only the
parameter  and the t-statistic are presented. Overall, the general pattern is consistent: higher ring
costs are associated with lower employment shares in high risk industries and higher shares in low risk
industries. The e¤ect is never lower in the latter part of the sample period, consisent with the outcome
of the model simulation with rising risk. The e¤ect varies a bit across country sample, and it seems that
inclusion of the transition economies weakens the e¤ect.
Table 10 shows the result after splitting the sample in countries with high versus low ring costs,
and industries into high risk and low risk sets. In the last column, we see the results for the full set of
17The level e¤ect of the exit costs, , is not shown. Because of the specication of the dependent variable as a share,
and the inclusion of industry xed e¤ects, the coe¢ cient captures small interactions between means of EPL and means of
shares over time and countries. The coe¢ cient is always very insignicant and close to zero in magnitude.
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sub-period
Sample 1995-2000 2000-2005 1995-2005
EU  :71
(5:04)
 :84
(5:49)
 :77
(7:15)
EUN  0:87
(6:72)
 :94
(6:89)
 0:91
(9:27)
EURO  :63
(3:32)
 :63
(7:15)
 :62
(4:62)
OECD  0:85
(7:85)
 0:94
(8:09)
 0:89
(10:81)
ALL  0:98
(9:52)
 1:04
(9:57)
 1:01
(12:98)
Table 9: Country/Period sub-samples
t-statistic in parenthesis. Industry rank: productivity variance; ExitCost: EPLRegular; Fixed E¤: industry
means & trends. See appendix for country listing.
industries, split by the level of layo¤ and exit costs and in the last row we see the results for all countries
split into columns by riskiness. For all of the permutations, the qualitative e¤ect is the same. Looking
across each row, the di¤erential impact of ring costs is higher in the high-risk industry sub-sample,
consistent with the outcome of the model simulation. In the model, ring costs become particularly
onerous when riskiness is high. Looking down the columns, the di¤erential impact of ring costs is higher
with low ring costs, also consistent with the model. When ring costs already are high, there is less
scope for an e¤ect of further increasing these costs because the amount of ring already is minimal.
Industry sub-sample
Country sub-sample Low risk High risk All
Low ring cost  2:67
(6:26)
 3:31
(7:84)
 1:65
(9:92)
High ring cost  1:35
(3:32)
 2:97
(6:52)
 1:07
(6:17)
All  1:03
(5:36)
 1:99
(9:91)
 1:01
(12:98)
Table 10: Country/Industry sub-samples
t-statistic in parenthesis. Period: 1995-2005; Industry Rank: productivity variance; ExitCost: EPLRegular;
Fixed E¤: industry means & trends. See appendix for country and industry listing.
Finally, Table 11 varies the indicators used for exit costs and for ranking of riskiness of industry. The
rst alternate indicator of riskiness captures the adoption and intensity of the use of broadband internet
by rms in each industry, from the ONS dataset and is measured as the percentage of workers with access
to broadband internet (DSL pct). The next measure is the ratio of productivity of the top quartile of
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rms to the mean in an industry, (P4/P). Because ring costs truncate from below, this indicator may
be less a¤ected by ring costs than the overall variance of productivity18 . The last column shows our
base measure, the variance of productivity. All industry riskiness rankings are averaged across countries
in the ONS dataset. The exit cost indicators are described and the values for each country are given
in the Appendix. For each exit cost indicator, the e¤ect is largest when the riskiness ranking is based
upon broadband penetration, slightly lower for the width of the top of the productivity distribution and
smallest for the overall variance measure of industry riskiness.
Riskiness indicator
Exit Cost DSLpct P4/P Variance
Exitloss%  5:08
(13:49)
 4:04
(10:66)
 3:52
(9:24)
Exitcost%  24:70
(17:01)
 19:38
(13:17)
 15:42
(10:40)
Firerule  0:68
(7:40)
 0:52
(5:64)
 0:45
(4:92)
Firecost  4:66
(15:26)
 4:18
(13:61)
 3:10
(9:99)
EPLoverall  1:04
(13:08)
 0:80
(9:86)
 0:64
(7:91)
EPLregular  1:21
(15:65)
 1:04
(13:46)
 1:01
(12:98)
Table 11: Alternate exit cost and riskiness indicators
t-statistic in parenthesis. Period: 1995-2005; Fixed E¤: industry means & trends. See appendix for indicator
denitions and country and industry listing.
The rst four exit cost indicators are sourced from the World Bank Cost of Doing Business Database
and the last two from the OECD. The rst two exit cost indicators are not directly associated with costs
of shedding workers, but relate to the percentage of annual revenue that is spent on exit (Exitcost%), and
the percentage of capital investment that may be reclaimed upon exit (Exitloss%). The other indicators
are related to costs of employment protection (an indicator of di¢ culty of ring, Firerule, and an indicator
of cost, Firecost%). Table 3 in the Appendix shows the values of these indicators for each country in our
sample in 2004.
18We also use riskiness indicators drawn from rm-level distributions in the UK which has the lowest level of exit costs in
the EU. The US has even lower ring costs than the UK, but the US productivity variance is only available for manufacturing
industries. We test all our results for all industries with the UK-based riskiness indicator or for manufacturing sectors only,
with US or EU-based riskiness indicators, with very similar results as presented in our main tables.
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As an additional robustness check, we randomly select 1200 industry rankings from all possible ordinal
rankings of our 26 industries and run our baselines regression to estimate the parameter  for each
ranking. The regressions are based on all countries, for the period 1995-2000, use EPL Regular as exit
cost indicator, and include industry xed e¤ects and industry time trends. Figure 7 shows the point
estimates for  with condence bounds. All the estimates of  reported in this paper, as well as the
estimates of  for all the permuations of ring costs, rankings, and samples we have explored, fall well
within the 5 percent largest negative estimates. Our preferred estimate with the productivity variance as
industry and EPL Regular as ring cost lies among the 1 percent largest (absolute) e¤ects of ring costs.
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Random rankings
g
95% CI
Figure 7: Estimates of gamma with random R()
Finally, we address the issue whether entry costs rather than ring costs are causing the small em-
ployment share of risky sectors. Our rst thoughts are that rms in both the safe and risky sector must
pay the entry fee, so that the rst order e¤ect of higher entry costs would not discriminate between them.
However, given the shorter expected life of a job in high risk sectors, more entry fees must be made to
maintain employment there compared to the safe sector, reducing its size in equilibrium. In terms of the
search model, fewer vacancies are needed to maintain the necessary ows into the safe sector, so that
its relative size may increase with increase in entry costs. In a simulation of the model, high entry fees
(keeping the ratio of c0=c1 constant) decrease the relative size of the risky sector. However, if ring costs
are increased from the calibrated value, the e¤ect of higher entry fees on relative size is much smaller.
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Our empirical ndings likewise are mixed, but always retain the negative e¤ect of ring costs. When
we run our basic specication of employment share in an industry regressed on the entry fee indicator, and
the indicator interacted with the industry riskiness ranking, we mostly nd signicantly negative e¤ects
on the interacted term, similar to the result for the employment protection index. When we included both
entry and exit costs, table 12 shows that the coe¢ cient on interacted employment protection variable
remains signicant when the entry costs variables are included, but that the size of the coe¢ cient is
reduced. For some of the entry cost indicators, the interacted e¤ect is signicantly negative, but for
others it is insigncant or even positive.
Entry Cost Indicator entry exit
Starting a Business - # of procedures  :04
(4:03)
 :52
(3:65)
Starting a Business - time (days)  :03
(5:17)
 :58
(5:17)
Starting a Business - cost (pct of capital)  :01
(1:21)
 :95
(11:14)
Di¢ culty of hiring (index)  :00
(:44)
 :97
(9:74)
Barriers to entrepreneurship  :11
(1:48)
 :81
(5:38)
Barriers to entrp. license and permits :05
(3:12)
 1:03
(13:09)
none. (only exit cost: EPLRegular)  1:01
(12:98)
Table 12: Labor share regressed on exit and entry costs
t-statistic in parenthesis. Period: 1995-2005; Industry rank: productivity variance; Exit Cost: EPLRegular;
Fixed E¤: industry means & trends.
7 Final remarks
In this paper we argue that the extent to which a country can benet from the advantages of risky
technologies depends on the institutional arrangements on ring and bankruptcy. The more employment
protection there is, the more costly it is to exercise the job destruction or rm exit option. This mechanism
can explain why the US was better able to explore the benets of the new information technology starting
in the mid 1990s. We construct a matching model with endogenous technology choice (risky or safe) and
nd that if we calibrate the model to the US that ring cost are in the order of about one month of
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production. If we increase this level to European levels (7 months of production), this reduces aggregate
productivity by about 10 percent, partly through a direct reduction of average productivity in the risky
sector, and partly through a signicant reduction of activity (employment) in the risky sector.
One of our simplifying assumptions was that workers are risk neutral. A natural question to ask
is wheter EPL is more desirable if workers are risk averse? This is not obvious since EPL makes the
unemployment state less attractive because it increases unemployment duration and risk averse workers
prefer the di¤erences between the good and bad state to be small. In other words, it puts the burden of
unemployment on a smaler group. In richer models where optimal UI benets and EPL are determined
jointly, optimal EPL may well be positive.
In future work we want to further explore the role of risky technologies on long term productivity and
growth. Simple simulations show that if the price of nancing risky projects increases and it becomes
more costly to open risky vacancies, this can have substantial e¤ects on productivity.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Characterization
In this Appendix, we give an analytical characterization of the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The job destruction margin is implicitly dened by
y + xd = b+

(1  ) (0c0 + 1c1) 

r + + 
Z xu
xd
[1  F (z)] dz   (r + ) k; (17)
the job creation condition in the risky sector is given by
m1
1
=
c1
J1(0)
=
c1
(1  )S1(0) =
(r + + ) c1
 (1  ) (xd + (r + + ) k) (18)
and job creation in the safe sector follows from from (20) and (25):
m0
0
=
c0 (r + + ) (r +  + m0)
(1  ) (r + + ) (y   b) +  (1  )m1 (xd + (r + + ) k) : (19)
Proof.
First substitute (8), (12) and (14) in the surplus equation (4):
(r + )S0 = y   b m0 [E0   U ] m1 [E1(0)  U ]
Using(6) and (7) yields
(r +  + m0)S0 = y   b  m1S1(0) (20)
Next, we turn to sector 1 and derive an expression for S1
Substitute (9), (12) and (15) in the surplus equation for sector 1 given by (5)
rS1(x) = y + x  w1(x)  J1 +  (1  )
Z xu
xd
[S1(z)  S1(x)] dF (z) + w1(x)   [E1   U ]
+
Z xu
xd
[S1(z)  S1(x)] dF (z)  rU   F (xd) (S1(x) + k)
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Simplifying yields:
(r + + )S1(x) = y + x+ 
Z xu
xd
S1(z)dF (z)  rU   F (xd)k (21)
Use E0   U = S0; E1   U = S1 (0) and U = S1 (xd) =  k to rewrite (12) as
rU = b+m0 [S0] +m1 [S1 (0)]
Plug this in (21)
(r + + )S1(x) = y   b+ x+ 
Z xu
xd
S1(z)dF (z)   (m0S0 +m1S1(0))  F (xd)k (22)
Integrating by parts gives
Z xu
xd
S1(z)dF (z) = S1(xu)  S1(xd)F (xd) 
Z xu
xd
S01(z)F (z)dz
Using S1(xd) =  k from (11) and adding and subtracting S1(xd) yields,
Z xu
xd
S1(z)dF (z) =
Z xu
xd
S01(z) [1  F (z)] dz   (1  F (xd)k) ;
plugging this back in (21) gives
(r + + )S1(x) = y   b+ x+ 
Z xu
xd
S01(z) [1  F (z)] dz    (1  F (xd)k)
  (m0S0 +m1S1(0))  F (xd)k
(r + + )S1(x) = y   b+ x+ 
Z xu
xd
S01(z) [1  F (z)] dz    (m0S0 +m1S1(0))  k (23)
Taking the derivative of S(x) in (21) with respect to x gives S01(x) =

r++ and substituting this
expression into (23) yields:
(r + + )S1(x) = y   b+ x+ 
r + + 
Z xu
xd
[1  F (z)] dz    (m0S0 +m1S1(0))  k (24)
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Next, return to the free entry conditions. Equation (2) implies:
J0 =
0
m0
c0;
use
J0= (1  ) = c00
(1  )m0 = S0 (25)
Evaluate (24) in x = xd and substitute (11) and (25) in :
  (r + ) k = y   b+ xd + 
r + + 
Z xu
xd
[1  F (z)] dz   
(1  ) (0c0 + 1c1)
Some rearrangement gives the job destruction equation for sector 1:
y + xd = b+

(1  ) (0c0 + 1c1) 

r + + 
Z xu
xd
[1  F (z)] dz   (r + ) k
In order to derive the Job creation curve in sector 1, use (23) to get:
(S1(x)  (S1(xd)) = (x  xd)
(r + + )
This implies that
S1(0) =
 xd
(r + + )
+ S1(xd) =
 xd
(r + + )
  k
where xd < 0:
We can now derive the job creation condition for sector 1 from (3):
m1
1
=
c1
J1(0)
=
c1
(1  )S1(0) =
(r + + ) c1
 (1  ) (xd + (r + + ) k)
The job creation condition for sector 0 follows from From (20), (25):
m0
0
=
c0 (r + + ) (r +  + m0)
(1  ) (r + + ) (y   b) +  (1  )m1 (xd + (r + + ) k)

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Equation (17) states that the lowest acceptable level of output for a rm is equal to the opportunity
cost of employment for the worker (i.e. the participation constraint) which is equal to the value of home
production, b, plus the value of search. In order for the worker to be willing to continue working, the
rm must compensate this worker for the foregone value of search. ici are vacancy creation cost per
unemployed worker in sector i, the higher this is, the higher the wage and the expected value of search
will be, see Pissarides (2000)). Wages and the value of search are also increasing in . The third term
on the rhs of (17) is the option value of keeping the job open which is increasing in ; the larger this
option value, the lower the minimum acceptable level of output is. Finally, the higher the exit cost is, the
lower the acceptable level of output will be. Besides the exit cost, what is new relative to Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) is that if 0 goes up xd will go up and job destruction in sector 1 as well. As we will
see, exit cost will increase 0=1. Equations (18) and (19) tell us that labor market tightness in a sector
is decreasing in workers bargaining power and increasing in the expected match surplus in that sector.
To close the model, we use the steady state ow equations that give the Beveridge curve which allows
us to calculate the equilibrium unemployment and vacancy rates. In each sector, in- and outow must
be equal.
m0u = e0 (26)
m1u = ( + F (xd)) (l   u  n  e0) : (27)
Finally, the size of the labor force is given by
l = H(rU) = H

b+

(1  ) (0c0 + 1c1)

:
where we eliminated rU in a similar way as in (17).
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Country overall EPL reg. EPL Firing Rules Firing Cost Exit Cost Exit Loss
AUS 1.19 1.50
AUT 1.93 2.37 2.0 0.02 0.18 0.27
BEL 2.18 1.73 0.5 0.16 0.04 0.14
CZE 1.90 3.31 1.5 0.22 0.18 0.85
DNK 1.42 1.47 0.5 0.00 0.04 0.37
ESP 3.05 2.61 1.5 0.56 0.15 0.23
FIN 2.02 2.17 2.0 0.26 0.04 0.12
FRA 3.05 2.47 2.0 0.32 0.09 0.54
GER 2.35 2.68 2.0 0.69 0.01 0.44
GRC 2.83 2.41 2.0 0.24 0.09 0.57
IRL 1.11 1.60 1.0 0.13 0.09 0.12
JPN 1.84 2.44
HUN 1.52 1.92
ITA 1.95 1.77 2.0 0.02 0.18 0.57
NLD 2.12 3.05 3.5 0.17 0.04 0.13
POL 1.74 2.23
PRT 3.67 4.33 2.5 0.95 0.09 0.27
SVK 1.92 3.47
SWE 2.24 2.86 2.0 0.26 0.09 0.19
UK 0.75 1.12 0.5 0.22 0.06 0.14
USA 0.21 0.17 0.0 0.00 0.07 0.20
Table 13: Exit Cost Indicators
(X excludes countries from sample)
ALL EUN EU EURO OECD
AUS X X X
AUT
BEL
CZE X X
DNK X
ESP
FIN
FRA
GER
GRC
HUN X X
IRL
ITA
JPN X X X
NLD
POL X X
PRT
SVK X X
SWE
UK X
USA X X X
Table 14: Country samples used in empirical exercise
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Mnemonic Description
Food, Bevarages and Tobacco
Clothing
Wood, Wood Products, Cork
Pulp, paper, publishing
Coke, rened petroleum and nuclear fuel
Chemicals
Rubber and plastics
Other Non-metallic minerals
Metals and Machinery
Machinery n.e.c.
Equipment
Motor Vehicles and Transport Equipment
Misc Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Construction
Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
Wholesale trade and commission trade, ex of motor vehicles
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Hotels and Restaurants
Transport
Post and Telecommunications
Banking
Business Services
Personal Services
Table 15: Industries included in empirical exercise
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